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FROM CONSULTATION TO RECONCILIATION:
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND THE CROWN'S DUTY
TO CONSULT
Sonia Lawrence` and Patrick Macklem**
Toronto
Thejudiciary has repeatedly called on First Nations and the Crown not to tax
the institutional competence ofthejudiciary by excessive litigation ofdisputes,
and instead to attempt to reach negotiated settlements . It has also held that the
Crown is undera duty to consult with a FirstNation when itproposes to engage
in an action that threatens to interfere with existingAboriginal or treaty rights
recognized and affirmed by s . 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . In this
Article, the authors argue that the duty to consult requires the Crown, in most
cases, to make good faith efforts to negotiate an agreement specifying the
rights ofthe parties when it seeks to engage in an action that adversely affects
Aboriginal interests .
De façon répétée, la magistrature a fait appel aux Premières Nations et à la
Couronnepourne pas la surchargerpardes litiges sur leurs différends, maispour
essayer plutôt d'arriver à des règlements négociés . Les tribunaux ontaussi décidé
que la Couronne a le devoir de consulter une Première Nation quand elle projette
de s'engager dans une action qui menace d'entrer en conflit avec des droits des
Autochtones ou des droits résultant de traités reconnuspar l'article 35, par. 1 de
l'Acte constitutionnel de 1982 . Dans cet article les auteurs soutiennent que le
devoirde consultation implique que la Couronne, dans la plupart des cas, doit de
bonne foi faire des efforts pour négocier une entente spécifiant les droits des
parties, quand elle cherche à s'engager dans une action qui peut affecter les
intérêts des Autochtones .
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I . Introduction
In northern British Columbia, about50 kilometres south ofPrince Rupert, lies
KumealonLake, a pristine body of water which, togetherwith its surroundings,
abounds with fish, other marine life and wildlife . Prior to European contact,
ancestors of the Kitkatla First Nation known as the Gitkaxaala .people, along
with other Aboriginal peoples, used Kumealon Lake and its surrounding lands
for activities andpractices necessary for its sustenance and survival . To this day,
theKumealon Lake region continues to provide important economic, cultural
and spiritual resources to the Kitkatla First Nation in its efforts to maintain its
distinctive indigenous identity.
In 1994, International Forest Products Ltd. (Interfor) began to log the
KumealonLake region underaforestlicense and several permits conferredby
the Government ofBritishColumbia pursuant to theprovincial ForestryAct. In
1997, after the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia,l the Kitkatla commencedlitigation seeking to enjoin Interfor from
logging the area. Sincecommencing its legal action, the Kitkatlahave received
no less thanelevenjudgmentsfrom the British Columbia SupremeCourtandthe
British Columbia Courtof Appeal . Most recently, the Kitkatla was ordered to
pay Interfor's costs afterthey appealed the dissolution of an exparte injunction
and the refusal of the British Columbia Supreme Court to issue another
injunction againstInterfor's logging in theKumealon watershed. As ofAugust,
1999, although the Kitkatla have an appeal pending, they do not have an
injunction protecting the' Kumealon.l
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
Kitkatla Band v . British Columbia (Minister ofForests), [1998] B.C.J . No .
2667 (B.C.S.C .) (June 18, 1998); Kitkatla Band v . British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), [1998] B.C.J . No . 1652 (B .C.C.A.) (June 24,1998) ; KitkatlaBandv . British
Columbia (Minister ofForests), [1998] B .C .J . No . 1598 (B .C.C.A.) (June 25,1998) ;
Kitkatla Band v . British Columbia (Minister- of Forests), [1998] B.C.J. No . 1616
(B.C.S.C .) (June 25, 1998); Kitkatla Band v . British Columbia (Minister ofForests),
[1998] B.C.J. No . 1599 (B .C.C.A.) (July 3, 1998); Kitkatla Band v . British Columbia
(Minister of Forests), [1998] B .C .J . No . 1600 (B .C.C.A .) (July 6, 1998); Kitkatla
Bandv . British Columbia (Minister ofSmallBusiness, Tourism'and Culture), [1998]
B.C.J .. No . 2440 (B.C.S.C.) (October 21, 1998); Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia
(MinisterofSmallBusiness, Tourism andCulture), (1998] B.C.J . No.3041(B.C . S. C.)
(December 15,1998) ; KitkatldBandv.BritishColumbia (Minister ofSmallBusiness,
Tourism and Culture) ; [1999] B.C.J . No . 177 (February 2, 1999); Kitkatla Band v.
British Columbia (Minister ofForests), [1999] B.C.J . No . 1074 (B .C.C.A .) (May 7,
1999); Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia-(Minister ofSmall Business, Tourism and




The Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in Delgamuukw v .
British Columbia appeared to many observers to establish new constitutional
benchmarks in the relationship between the Crown and First Nations . It
held that Aboriginal title is protected as amatter of constitutional right, and
affirmed that theCrown is underaduty to consult with aFirst Nation before
undertaking action that might interfere with a First Nation's Aboriginal
title. The Court's affirmation of the Crown's duty to consult is especially
significant inlight ofrepeatedjudicial calls for First Nations and the Crown
not to tax the institutional competence of the judiciary by excessive
litigation ofdisputes, and instead to attemptto reach negotiated settlements.
Perhaps the most well-known expression of this sentiment is Lamer C.J.'s
statement in Delgamuukw that "[u]ltimately, it is through negotiated
settlements, with good faith and give andtake on all sides, reinforced by the
judgments of this Court, that we will achieve . . . the basic purpose of s.
35(l)-'the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with
the sovereignty of the Crown. "'3
But Delgamuukw's call for negotiated settlements and its affirmation
of the Crown's duty to consult appear to have had little impact on disputes
like the one involving the Kitkatla First Nation and Interfor. In fact, the
Kitkatla litigation suggests that the duty to consult has produced the very
effect that it was designed to minimize, namely excessive reliance on the
judiciary to reconcile competing interests of the parties . Consultation
processes, by and large, have not led to lasting settlements. Instead,
consultations increasingly serve as a kind of pre-trial discovery process,
closely resembling the litigation they were intended to forestall, and
constituting the first step in protracted legal disputes.4
Ourpremise in this Article is that the reason why the duty to consult is
failingto accomplish its purpose is because ithas been widely misunderstood-
by parties, by counsel, and by courts . This misunderstanding arises from a
tendency to regard the duty as a legal requirement that assists in determining
whether the Crown is constitutionally justified in engaging in a particular
action that infringes on an existing Aboriginal or treaty right of a First
Nation. That is this one of its functions is no doubt true, but characterizing
Delgamasukw, supra at 1123-24 (quotingR. v . Van derPeet, [199612 S .C.R. 507,
at 539) . See also R . v . Marshall (unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
rendered November 17, 1999), at para. 22 ("the process of . . . accommodation . . . may best
be resolved by consultation and negotiation of a modern agreement for participation in
shared resources . . . rather than by litigation") .
See J. Woodward and R.J.M. Janes Fulfilling the Promise of Consultation :
StrategiesandTactics inFirstNations, The EnvironmentandDevelopment:The Emerging
Duty to Consult (Canadian Bar Association - Ontario, 1999 Institute ofContinuing Legal
Education Conference, January 28-30, 1999) . See also J. Woodward, First Nation
Empowerment Over Traditional Territories : An End to False Consultation, in Pacific
Business & Law Institute, Environmental Law and Canada's First Nations (Conference
Proceedings, November 18-19, 1999) .
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the Crown's duty in this manner obscures the extent to which it also
operates ex ante to minimize reliance on litigation as a means ofrecognizing
and affirming Aboriginal and treaty rights . Properly understood, the duty
to consult also acts as a prelude to apotential infringementofanAboriginal
or treaty right. Consultation requirements ought to be calibrated according
to the nature and extent of Aboriginal interests and the severity of the
proposed Crownaction in order to provide incentives to the parties to reach
negotiated agreements . In most cases, the duty requires the Crownto make
good faith efforts to negotiate an agreement with the First Nation in
question that translates Aboriginal interests adversely affected by the
proposed Crown action into binding Aboriginal ortreaty rights . Byrealizing
the duty's ex ante possibilities, the judiciary will have more success in its
efforts to promote reconciliation between First Nations and the Crown.
A. TheParameters ofthe Duty
II . Consultation in the Courts
The Supreme Court of Canada has_,provided general guidance in a number
of cases on the circumstances in which the Crown owes a duty to consult
with a First Nation . It is clear that the Crown must consult with a First
Nation when it seeks to interfere- with rights associated with Aboriginal
cultural interests. In R . v. Sparrow, at issue was the constitutionality of
federal fishing regulations imposing a permit requirement and prohibiting
certain methods of fishing. TheMusqueam First Nation ; located in British
Columbia, had, fished since ancient times in an area of the Fraser River
estuary known as Canoe Passage .. According to anthropological evidence
at trial, salmon is not only an important source of food for the Musqueam
but also plays a central role in Musqueam cultural identity . TheMusqueam
argued that the federal fishing requirements interferedmith their Aboriginal
fishing rights and were invalid in light of s . 35(1) .
In its landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Canada found for the
Musqueam First Nation, and held that Aboriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by s . 35(1) include practices that form an "integral part" of an
Aboriginal community's "distinctive culture. -5 If such rights "existed" as
of 1982, that is, if such rights had not been ".extinguished" by state action
prior to 1982, then any law that unduly interferes with their exercise must
meet relatively strict justificatory requirements .6 One such requirement,
according to the Court, is that the Crown consult with Aboriginal people
prior to introducing natural resource conservation measures that interfere
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with the exercise of an Aboriginal right to fish . Specifically, the Court held
that the constitutionality offish conservation regulations that interfere with
the exercise of an Aboriginal right to fish woulddepend in part "onwhether
the Aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the
conservation measures being implemented."
The Court has also made it clear that the Crown must consult with
Aboriginal people when it seeks to interfere with rights associated with
Aboriginal territorial interests . In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en nations claimed
Aboriginal title to 58,000 square kilometres of the interior of British
Columbia . The Gitksan sought to prove historical use and occupation of
part of the territory in question by entering as evidence their "adaawk",
which is a collection of sacred oral traditions about their ancestors,
histories and territories . The Wet'suwet'en entered as evidence their
"kungax", which is a spiritual song or dance or performance which ties
them to their territory. Both the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en also introduced
evidence of their feast hall, in which they tell and re-tell their stories and
identify their territories to maintain over time their connection with their
lands.
Thetrialjudge admitted theaboveevidencebutaccorded it little independent
weight, stating that, because of its oral nature, it could not serve as evidence of
detailed history, or land ownership, use of occupation .$ He concluded that
ancestors ofthe Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples lived within the territory in
question prior to the assertion of British sovereignty, but predominantly at
village sites, whichhad already been identified as reserve lands, and, as aresult,
hedeclared they didnot ownorpossess Aboriginal title to thebroader territory . 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial for procedural
reasons, but ruled that Aboriginal title is protected in its full form by s. 35 . In
the event of an interference with rights associated with Aboriginal title,
according to the Court, "[there is always a duty ofconsultation" that forms part
of the Court's inquiry into "whether the infringement of Aboriginal title is
justified."lo
Finally, the Court has indicated that the Crown is under a duty to
consult with Aboriginal people in the event of an infringement of a treaty
right recognized andaffirmedby s. 35 . InR . v. Badger, at issue waswhether
the Treaty 8 right to hunt provided a defence to a charge under Alberta's
Wildlife Act, whichprohibited hunting out-of-season and hunting without
a license . TheCourt held that Treaty 8 protectedhunting for food on private
property that was not put to a visible, incompatible use, and that the right
Ibid. at 1119 .
Uuktiv v. R., [198716 W.W.R. 155, at 181 (B .C .S.C .) .
[199113 W.W.R . 97, at 383 (B .C .S.C .) .
10 Supra at 1113 .
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to hunt was a treaty right within the meaning of s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act. The Court, stated that "a treaty represents an exchange of solemn
promises . . . . [and] an agreement whose nature is sacred." 11 It noted that
"aboriginal and treaty rights differ in both origin and structure ."12 It
reiterated that treaties oughtto be interpreted in "amanner whichmaintains
the integrity, of the Crown" and that ambiguities or doubtful expressions in
the wording of the treaty or document must be resolved in favour of the
Indians." 13 The Court further held that treaty rights can be unilaterally
abridged by the Crown so long as the law in question meets justificatôry
standards similar to those that operate in relation to laws thatinterfere with
the exercise bf Aboriginal,rights, but it suggested that given the fact that a
treaty constitutes "a solemn agreement, . . . it is equally if not more
important to . justify prima facie infringements of treaty rights ."14
Accordingly, the Crownlikely is under aduty to consult in the event of an
infringement of a treaty right recognized and affirmed by s . 35 .
The Court has also addressed at some length the nature and scope of the
Crown's dutyto consult. InDelgamuukwv. British Columbia, LamerC.J . stated
that:
[t]henature and scopeofthe dutyofconsultation willvary withthecircumstances . In
occasional cases, whenthebreach is less serious orrelatively minor, it willbenomore
than a duty to discuss important decisions . . . . Ofcourse, evenin these rare cases when
the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith andwith the intention ofsubstantially addressing the concerns ofthe Aboriginal
peoples'wh6se lands are at issue . In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than
mere consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an Aboriginal
nation, particularly when provincesenacthunting and fishing'regulations in relation
to Aboriginal lands.15 . .
As stated, the Court inDelgamuukw also reiterated a callfornegotiation, rather
thanlitigation, as, a means ofachieving reconciliation between FirstNations and
the Crown, adding that:
s.35(1) "provides asolid constitutional baseupon which subsequent negotiations
cantake place." Those negotiations should also include other Aboriginal nations
which have a stake in the territory claimed. Moreover, the Crown is under a
moral, if not legal, duty to enter into and ,conduct those negotiations in good
faith.16
The Court's call for negotiated settlements is especially significant given the
detailed andcomplex political, economic,jurisdictional, andremedialjudgments
11 [199611 S.C.R. 7111 at 793. ,
12 Ibid . at 812. ,
13 Ibid . at 794.
14 Ibid. at 814.
15, Supra at 1113 .




necessary to resolve competing claims to territory and authority . 17 Even if
the judiciary could tailor rules and remedies to address these issues in a
detailed manner, negotiations are clearly preferable to court-imposed
solutions . Litigation is expensive and time-consuming . Negotiation permits
parties to address each other's real needs and reach complex and mutually
agreeable trade-offs . 18 A negotiated agreement is more likely to achieve
legitimacy than a court-ordered solution, if only because the parties
participated more directly and constructively in its creation . Andnegotiation
mirrors the nation-to-nation relationship thatunderpins the law ofAboriginal
title and structures relations between First Nations and the Crown. Instead
of attempting to exhaustively define the respective rights of the parties at
first instance, the judiciary ought to first endeavour to enforce the Crown's
duty to consult in a manner that creates incentives on the parties to reach
negotiated agreements.
B. The Practicalities ofthe Ditty
Within the broad parameters established by the Supreme Court of
Canada, lower courts have been left with the unenviable task ofdetermining
many of the practicalities of the duty to consult, including questions
relating to the who, when andhow of consultation . With respect to the issue
of who bears the duty to consult, the emerging case law attaches the duty
to the Crown and third parties in a manner consistent with the objective of
creating incentives on the parties to reach negotiated settlements . With
respect to the question of when the duty arises, however, most decisions
treat the duty simply as an element of an ex post justification of an
infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty right, thereby frustrating the duty's
ex ante possibilities. With respect to how consultations are to occur, most
decisions also fail to vest the duty with any meaningful content. The result
is a duty to consult that is essentially procedural in nature, stripped of its
ability to foster negotiated settlements. However, countering this trend are
several decisions that regard the duty as a prelude to apotential infringement
of an Aboriginal or treaty right, and suggest that the duty requires more of
the Crown than mere procedural fairness . Coupled with a richer
understanding of the duty's potential to create incentives for parties to
17 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Final Report, vol . 2,
Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1996), at 561-62 . See also Pacific Fishermen's Defence Alliance v . Canada, [1987]
3 F.C . 272 (T.D .), at 284 ("[b]ecause of their socio-economic and political nature, it
is indeed much preferable to settle aboriginal rights by way of negotiation than
through the Courts") .
18 See M.A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation : Dispute Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 Harv . L. Rev. 637 (1976) .
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avoid litigation, these decisions ought to serve as the starting point for .a
jurisprudence that seeks to:foster reconciliation through negotiation.
1. Attaching the Duty
A number of lower court decisions addressing the Crown's duty to
consult hold that the Crown cannot cabin its obligations according to its
internal administrative structures or . delegate such obligations to third
parties . Both developments lend themselves to a jurisprudence that fosters
negotiated settlements . With respect to the former, in light ofthe fiduciary
relationship that exists between the Crown;andAboriginal people, the duty
to consult attaches to the Crown. However, the duty attaches to the Crown
in general, and not to any particular decision-maker . Various ministries
can, as it were, share the duty to consult. In Kelly Lake First Nation, for
example, at issue was a decision by British Columbia to authorize the
development of an exploratory gas well on land possessing historical and
spiritual significance to the Kelly Lake First Nation . The' ultimate decision
was to be made by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, but part of the
consultationwasundertaken by the Ministry ofEmployment and Investment .
Taylor J. accordingly treated "MEI . . . as an adjunct to MEM in this
process." 19
Similarly, in Labrador Metis Association v. Canada (Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans), a case involving a refusal by the Department of
Fisheries andOceans to grant a communal fishing license to the Association,
the court regarded the DFO to be still part of the consultation process when
it sent a letter to the Association urging it to continue providing information
to the Department of Justice, stating that "DFO will continue to consult
with these agencies on this issue over the winter." 20 And in Kitkatla Band
v. British Columbia (Minister ofSmall Business, Tourism and Culture), the
petitioners` challenged the decision of the Minister under the Heritage
Conservation Actpermitting Interfor to harvest culturally modified trees in
the Kumealon Lake region . Wilson J. held that the letter sent by the
Ministry of Small Business, Tourism and Culture was "not informative"
and that "notification and opportunity to consult were both inadequate in
this case."21 Wilson J. stated -further that the faulty procedure couldnot be
19 Kelly Lake Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister ofEnergy and Mines), [19981
B.C .J . No. 2471 (October 23, 1998) (B.C .S .C .) at para . 241 ("no authority . . . requires the
decision-maker to personally inquire and receive the informationuponwhich the decision
is made or to personally engage in consultation") .
zo [19971 F.C .J . No . 132 (F.C.T.D .), at para. 5.
21 Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business ; Tourism and
Culture), [19991 B.C .J . No . 2440, Victoria Registry No. 982223 (October 21, -1998)
(B.C .S .C .), at paras. 45, 47.
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answered by the fact that the petitioners were in consultation with the
Ministry of Forests, since the Heritage Conservation Act prevails over
other statutes in this regard . According to Wilson J ., "[fhe petitioners are
entitled to an informed decision by the responsible Minister.-22
The foregoing cases suggest that, at least in certain circumstances, the
Crown cannot unilaterally decide which internal administrative departments
are responsible forfulfilling the duty, and that the duty may require coordinated
efforts across departmental lines. Constraining Crown discretionin this manner
furthers the duty's broader objective of minimizing litigation. So long as there
exists clear lines of communication between the parties, departmental
coordination fosters transparent consultation processes that take into account
the range of Crown and Aboriginal interests at stake in possible negotiated
settlements . It also creates an incentive on the Crown to establishprocesses for
inter-departmental scrutiny of the adequacy of consultation initiatives of
particular officials and departments, and to develop a coordinated strategy to
seek to avoid litigated outcomes .
With respect to Crown action that authorizes a private entity, such as
a corporation, to engage in activity that may interfere with the exercise of
Aboriginal ortreaty rights, Crown policy often requires the private company
to consult with adversely affected FirstNations . Courts have been relatively
strict in requiring a continuing Crown presence in consultations assumed
by third parties. In Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia, for
example, at issue was a Crown decision to approve the application of a
forestry company for a timber cutting permit in an area alleged to be
integral to the traditional culture of the Halfway River First Nation .
Meetings between the First Nation and the forestry companywhichdid not
involve the District Manager were not considered consultation "for the
purposes of determining whether [the District Manager] met his fiduciary
obligations ."23
Similarly, in Tsilhgot' in National Government v. British Columbia, a
case involving the granting of a pesticide use permit, the British Columbia
Environmental Appeal Board noted that ministerial consultation policy
"requires the proponent for pesticide use permits to take the lead role in
identifying aboriginal rights associated with a proposed pesticide use
program and to consult with First Nations as required to determine those
rights ."24 Although the Board, citing Halfway River, regardedthe delegating
of the duty to be "problematic," it held that "[t]he delegation of the
responsibility to implement consultation may satisfy the government's
fiduciary obligation in some cases, but not in others," noting the potential
22 Ibid. at para. 49 .
23 Halfway River First Nation v. B.C. (Minister ofForests), [1997] 4 C.N.L.R . 45
(B.C.S.C.), at 71 .
24 [1998] B.C.E.A . No . 23, Appeal No . 97-PES-08, at para 51 .
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for mistrust and conflict of interest . 25 Nevertheless, it concluded that there
was sufficient involvement by the Ministry of Environment, Lands and
Parks and the Ministry of Forests to meet the Crown's fiduciary obligation
to consult with the Tsilhqot'in . It noted that MELP was informed of the
progress of consultation efforts, corresponded directly with the Tsilhqot'in
regarding its -concerns, and became directly involved when it deemed it
necessary, while MOF oversaw some of the consultation processes .26
Arequirement that the Crownmaintainacontinuingpresence inconsultations
assumed by athirdparty is consistent with the objective of fostering negotiated
settlements . Inclusion of a third party in a consultation process enhances the
likelihood that the parties will be able to identify and attempt to reconcile all of
the relevant competing interests . Authorizing Crown delegation of the duty to
a third party only insofar as the Crown maintains supervisory responsibility
over the third party's actions promotes accountability. But while the emerging
case law attaches the duty in a manner consistent withthe objective of creating
incentives on theparties to reach negotiated settlements, it tends to trigger the
duty only on the showing of a violation ofanexisting Aboriginal or treaty right
and, once triggered, regards the duty's content in purely procedural terms . As
discussed below, both developments frustrate the duty's ability to foster
negotiated settlements .
2 . Triggering the Duty
Lower courts have held that the duty to consult is triggered upon the
showing of a violation of an existing Aboriginal or treaty right recognized
and affirmed by s . 35(1) ofthe ConstitutionAct, 1982. Given that the Crown
must fulfil its duty to consult with a First Nation if it seeks to justify any
action that constitutes a prima facie violation of s . 35(1), this proposition
is consistent with the broad parameters of the duty as established by the
Supreme Court of Canada. But a number of cases suggest that the duty is
triggered only when the Aboriginal or treaty right in question has been
established as an existing right within the meaning of s . 35(1) either by
treaty, or litigation . 27 In Kelly Lake, for example, Taylor J . stated that the
Crown must "consult withFirst Nationpeople before making decisions that
will affect rights either established through litigation or recognized by
government as existing ."28
25 Ibid. at para. 56.
26 Ibid ; at para. 59 .
27 Seegenerally,WoodwardandJanes,FulfillingthePromiseofConsultation,supra,
and cases cited therein. See also J.J.L. Hunter, Q.C . ; Consultation WithFirstNations Prior
to Natural Resource Development, in Pacific Business & Law Institute, Environmental
Law and Canada's First Nations (Conference Proceedings, November .l8-19, 1999) .




What this proposition overlooks is that in most cases involving the
assertion of Aboriginal or treaty rights, the First Nation in question is
simultaneously attempting to establish the existence of its rights and
prevent interference with those rights by the Crown or a third party. If the
duty to consult is triggered only in cases where the law already recognizes
that the First Nation possesses the right in question, the duty to consult will
not apply where an injunction is sought pending determination of the
plaintiff's rights . This approach maymake sense ifthe duty to consult only
operates as one element of a justification of a Crown or third party action
that interferes with an existing right . But the Court's treatment of the duty
in Delgamuukw as part of a justification of an infringement of an existing
right illuminates only oneconsequence of breach of the duty, namely, that
breach will affect the constitutionality of aCrown or third party action that
amounts to an infringement . If the duty also operates to minimize reliance
on litigation, as a means of determining the nature and scope ofAboriginal
and treaty rights, it must also apply in cases where a First Nation asserts
rights that have yet to be formally recognized by a court of law or treaty .
Breach in this contextmight well affect the ultimate constitutionality of the
proposed Crown or third party action, but it should also result in remedies
that facilitate outcomes determined by the parties themselves without the
need for subsequent litigation.
A number of cases hint at this richer understanding of the duty .29 In
Halfway River, Dorgan J. rejected the proposition that the duty to consult
does not arise until theFirst Nation has established aprimafacie infringement
of s . 35(1), stating that such a holding would be "inappropriate given the
relationship between the Crown and Native people ."30 Instead, Dorgan J.
held that the duty governs decisions that may affect the exercise of
Aboriginal or treaty rights . And, on appeal, Huddart J.A . in a concurring
decision stated that the Crown is "required to initiate a process of adequate
and meaningful consultation . . . to ascertain the nature and scope of the
treaty right at issue." 31 These holdings come close to realizing the duty's
potential to minimize litigation, but, as discussed at greater length in Part
II, the duty can only achieve its purpose if it requires the Crown to make
good faith efforts to first jointly define the nature and scope of Aboriginal
or treaty rights before it seeks to determine the extent to which its proposed
actions might infringe such rights .
29 See Halfway RiverFirstNation v . British Columbia (Minister ofForests) [1997]
4 C.N.L.R. 45 (B.C.S .C .) ; R . v . Jack (1995) 16 B.C.L.R . (3d) 201, [1996] 2 C.N.L.R . 113
(C.A.); R. v . Noel, [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 78 (N.W.T. Terr. CQ . See also Cheslatta Carrier
Nation v. British Columbia, [1998] 3 C.N.L.R . 1 (B.C .S.C .) ("the Crown always bears a
common law duty to consult where Aboriginal land issues arise") .
30 Halfway RiverFirst Nation, ibid. at 71 .
31 Halfway River First Nation v . British Columbia (Minister ofForests), [1999]
B.C.J. No . 1880 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 191, per Huddart J.A ., concurring.
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3 . Fulfilling the Duty
As stated, the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamitukw indicated that the
content ofthe dutyofconsultationwillvarywith the circumstances . Specifically,
it held that:
In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious orrelatively minor, it will be no
more than adutyto discuss important decisions thatwillbe takenwithrespect tolands
held pursuant . t o Aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the
minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good faith,
and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the Aboriginal
peopleswhoselands are atissue. In mostcases it willbe significantly deeper thanmere
consultation . Some cases may even require the full consent of an Aboriginal nation,
particularly when provinces enact hunting, and fishing regulations in relation to
Aboriginal lands32
Lower courts have studiously ignored the significance of the sliding scale of
consultation proposed in Delgamuukw. In so,doing, they seriously impair the
capacity ofthe duty to consult to serve as an instrument to minimize litigation.
Specifically, .lower courts have not attempted to calibrate the content ofthe
duty to the nature of the decision . They typically do not require of the Crown
anything more than the duty's "minimal acceptable standard" of meaningful
consultation, let alone require the Crown to obtainthe «full consent>> ofthe First
Nation in question . 33 In R. v . Jack, a case involving the constitutionality of a
provision of the Fisheries Act, for example, the court stated :
we do not agree . .. that the consultation between the DFO and the band required that
theDFO reach agreement with the band on all conservation measures. To so interpret
the consultation . . .would be to conclude that the band was entitled to veto any
conservation measure which theDFO wished to implement between the DFO andthe
band.34
32 Supra at 1113 .
33 Ibid . See Halfivay River First Nation v . British Columbia (Minister ofForests),
[1999] B.C.J. No. 1880 (B.C.C.A .), perFinchJ.A . (no referenceto Delgamuukw orsliding
scale), and per Huddart J.A ., concurring (citing Delgamuukw but omitting mention of
sliding scale) ; Cheslatta Carrier Nation, supra at 14 (citing Delgamuukw but omitting
mentionofsliding scale) ;Alberta WildernessAssociationv . Canada, [1998]F.C.J . No . 540
(F.C.T.D .); at para 16 (citing Delgamuukw but omitting mention of sliding scale) ; Kelly
Lake Cree First Nation, supra (citing Delgamuukw but not applying sliding scale);
Tsilhqot'in National .Government, supra (citing Delgamuukw but not applying sliding
scale) ; Sushwap Thompson Organic Producers Ass'n, [1998] B.C.E.A. No. 24 (no
reference to Delgamuukw or sliding scale) . We are aware of only one case requiring the
Crown to obtain the consent of a First Nation: Mushkegowuk Council et al . v. Ontario,
[1999] O.J. No. 3170 (Ont . S .C .J.) (province-must obtain consent of First Nation before
requiring it to administer "workfare" program) .
34, (1995) 131 D.L.R . (4th) 165 at 189 (B.C.C.A .), at189 . See also R . v . Sampson
(1995),131 D.L.R. (4th) 192 (B.C.C.A.), at220 ("we donotinterpret `consultation'to mean
`agreement' . . . : [or] accede . . . to the submission . . . [that] the Crown must establish
`informed consent' by anIndian band" to a proposed regulation ofanIndian food fishery) .
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Instead, lower courts have relied heavily on a test first developed by Dorgan
J. in Halfway River prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Delgamuukw, which requires that the Crown (a) provide a First Nation that
may be affected by government legislation or a decision with "full
information" on the proposed legislation or decision; (b) fully inform itself
of the practices and views of the First Nation; and (c) undertake meaningful
and reasonable consultation with the First Nation .35 As discussed below,
these three requirements require little more than the sharing of information
and procedural fairness . While both information sharing and procedural
fairness are critical to any consultation process that fosters negotiated
outcomes, the duty to consult must require more of the Crown if it is to
create incentives on the parties to jointly determine the nature and scope of
Aboriginal rights without resort to litigation .
With respect to the first requirement, full information includes notice to
affected FirstNations ofthefactthat the Crown intends to engage in activity that
might affect the exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights . In Kitkatla Band, for
example, Wilson J . stated that "there is a duty on the Crown to provide an
opportunity for consultation to First Nations ; and a correlative right on First
Nations tobe extended the opportunity to consult," adding that "the crown must
take the initiative in the consultative process ."36 In R. v. Jack, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that the Crown's duty to consult includes an
obligation to inform the First Nation of the proposed Crown action prior to its
implementation.37
Full information includes not only information about the proposed project
but also its expectedimpact on the environment . In Cheslatta Carrier Nation v.
British Columbia, a case that implicated a statutorily mandated environmental
assessment of an energy project, Williams C.J.S.C . held that the constitutional
requirement on the Crown to consultwith affected First Nations entailedthat the
mining company, when requested, should have provided wildlife information
maps of the area in dispute:
Those maps plus the information which they should have brought forth wouldat least
have given the petitioners and opportunity to consider the impact on their lives and
3s Tsilhqot'in National Government, supra at 71 (summarizing the trial decision of
HalfwayRiver,supra, althoughHalfwayRiverdoesnotspeakof"meaningful" consultations) .
On appeal, Finch J.A. in Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), [1999] B.C.J. No . 1880, at para. 160, defined the duty in similar terms (the duty
to consult obligates the Crown "to reasonably ensure that aboriginal people are provided
with all necessary information in a timely way so that they will have an opportunity to
express theirinterests and concerns, and to ensure that their representations are seriously
considered and, wherever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of
action") .
36 Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and
Culture), supra at para . 46 .
37 Supra at 189 ("it was the duty ofthe DFO to inform the band ofthe conservation
being implemented before they were implemented") .
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theirland, and to consider what measures orcompensationwould berequired . Ifthey
hadpossessed adequate and requisite wildlife information, the Petitioners could have
carefully considered theirresponse andbrought any concerns they mighthavehad to
the attention ofthe Project Committee3 8
With respect to the second requirement, in determining whetherthe Crown
has fulfilled the duty to inform itself of the practices and views of the First
Nation, courts have looked to the materials produced by the consultation
process, as well as to the final decision rendered by the government, for
evidence that the Crownunderstood the concerns of the First Nation. In R.
v. Bones, forexample, at issue wasthe constitutionality offishing regulations.
In holding the regulations to be unconstitutional, Barnett J. regarded the
evidence of consultation was "not convincing", noting that while the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans employed a biologist to design and
manage the fishery, "[h]e says he knows nothing about Indian cultures or
fishing practices .. . . This seems to me a strange way of doing things."39
Referring to testimonyby this official to the effect that he did notknow why
"as the fall period begins [the Aboriginal fishers] go out less andless," the
judge stated that "[i]f OFO officials really listened to Indian people they
might learn why [they] fish when they do."4o
The third requirement, namely, that consultations be both meaningful and
reasonable, obligates theCrown to be prepared tomake changes to its proposed
actionbasedoninformationobtainedthrough consultations . 1 Thisrequirement
is capable ofincorporating the sliding scale proposed in Delgamuukw, butmost
lower court decisions appear to regard fulfillment of the first tworequirements
as constituting sufficiently meaningful and reasonable consultations . Some
cases 'even waive this requirement, allowing the Crown to proceed with its
38 Supra at 18 .
39 R. v . Bones, [1990] 4 C.N.L.R. 37 (B.C.Prov. CQ, at 42 .
40 Ibid . at 45 . See alsoHeiltsukTribal Councilv.DeputyMinister, Pesticide Control
Act, [1997] -B .C.E.A. No . 20, Appeal No.95-33(b), at para 55 (lack of clarity about the
aboriginal rights in the areaofproposed activity seen as evidence that the consultation was
inadequate) ; HalfwayRiver, supra at 73-74 (theCrown shouldhave informed itselffurther
"with respect to potential infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights" when a Cultural
Heritage Overview Assessment held by the District Manager stated that "[this report fails]
to adequately address the concerns and management needs of forest managers and First
Nations").
41 See Halfway River First Nation v . British Columbia (Minister ofForests),
[1999] B.C.J . No .' 1880, atpara.' 160, perFinch J.A . (the duty obligates the Crown "to
ensure that [Aboriginal] representations are seriously considered and, wherever
possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action") ; see also R. v.
Bones, supra at 42 (suggesting that the Crownunder an obligation to enter theprocess
prepared to change policies, and criticizing Crown's approach as "leading to nothing
more than minor amendments ... and such in-season changes as are necessary");
Treaty 8 TribalAssociation v .BritishColumbia (Minister offorests) [1994] B.C.E.A.





action in the absence of any consultations at all. For instance, in R . v . Pine, the
judge stated
I infer from the language used in the Sparrow, Badger andNikal cases that although
consultation is desirable and expected . direct consultation is not in every case
mandatory, so long as an analyses demonstrates that the justificatory standard
imposed by Sparrow is met in the specific factual context of each case.42
Similarly, in R . v . Couillonneur, s . 38(1)(d) of the Saskatchewan Fishery
Regulation under the federal Fisheries Act was challenged as infringing the
rights underTreaty 10 of a member ofthe Canoe Lake First Nation . Nightingale
J. found "no evidence to show that the Aboriginal peoples of the Canoe Lake
area were consulted before theregulation was enacted."43 Nonetheless, he held
that "in all ofthe circumstances I do not find that the regulation was enacted in
a high-handed or paternalistic fashion, or one which ignored the needs and
preferences of the peoples affected," and upheld the constitutionality of the
regulation in question .44
InHeiltsukTribal Councilv . DeputyAdministrator, Pesticide ControlAct,
however, a case involving a challenge of a pesticide permit, the British
Columbia Environmental Appeal Board held that the Crown was obligated to
consult with FirstNations adversely affectedby the decisionto grantthepermit.
It held further that consultation is meaningful when it involves a process that is
not "adversarial" but one that is "well thought out" and attempts to determine
the nature and scope of Aboriginal rights in the area, the extent to which those
rights would be infringed by the proposed activity, and how an infringement
maybe avoided .45 It also regardedmeaningful consultation to include aprocess
that shows sensitivity to Aboriginal values, that "recognizes different
communication styles than letters and telephone calls," and that includes
building a relationship of trust with aboriginal people, and not merely "filling
a bureaucratic requirement . "46
42 [1997] O.J. No . 1004,CourtFile 97-09504 (January 29,1997) (Gen.Div.), atpara 55 .
43 [199711 C.N.L.R . 130, at 138 (Sask . P.C .) (emphasis deleted) .
44 Ibid . Couillonneur was cited and followed in R . v. CroweandIronchild, [1997] 3
C.N.L.R . 155 (Sask. Prov . CQ. Afternoting the general features ofthe 1980 consultation
process when the claimed infringement (the Woody Lake Road Corridor Game Preserve)
was created, Bobowski P.C.J. stated that "[t]here was no evidence as to how SERM
[Saskatchewan Department ofEnvironmentand Resource Management] would determine
whether ornot subsistence hunting needs were met, although the evidence suggested that
no complaints were received by SERMfrom First Nations people and from this apparently
the conclusion was drawn that there is no problem ." He concluded, citing Couillonneur,
that "although there is no specific evidence as to who was consulted, the Federation of
Saskatchewan Indian Nations was afforded an opportunity to be involved in the decision
making process of setting up the Road Corridor. They chose not to do so . . . .the setting up
ofthe Road Corridor was notdone soin ahigh-handed or paternalistic fashion or onewhich
ignored the needs and preferences of the affected Aboriginal people ."
45 Supra at para . 37 .
46 Ibid. at para. 36 .
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Together, thesethreerequirements obligatethe Crown,when contemplating
an action thatmight adversely affect aFirstNation's interests, to providenotice,
gather and share relevant information, and act in a procedurally fair manner to
the First Nation . But these requirements do notexhaust the content ofthe duty;
as discussed in the following Part, most disputes require the Crown to make
good faith efforts to negotiate an agreement specifying the rights of the
respective parties to the territory in question .
III. Toward aJurisprudence ofReconciliation
If the duty to consult is to serve as an instrument that fosters reconciliation
between First Nations and the, Crown the judiciary must begin to fashion a
jurisprudencethatcreatesincentives onthe partiestoreachnegotiated settlements
without resort to litigation. As discussed in theprevious Part, critical to this task
is a recognition ofthe fact that the duty to consult is not simply one element of
a justification test governing,infringements of existing Aboriginal or treaty
rights . The duty to consult also operates ex ante on the parties, requiring the
Crown to initiate discussions with any First Nation whose interests appear to
adversely affected by a proposed Crown action to attempt to jointly determine
the rights of thexespective parties .
In the following section, we argue that implementing the duty's exante
purpose also requires an acknowledgement that the content of the duty
varies from context to context, depending on the nature and extent of the
First Nation's interests andthe severity of the Crown action in question . In
some circumstances, where the adverse effect of the action in question
appears to be minimal, the duty requires the Crown to do little more than
what lower courts already require of .the Crown; namely, that it provide
notice, gather and sharerelevant information, and act in a procedurally fair
manner to the First Nation . In most cases, however, the duty imposes
heightened consultation requirements on the Crown, including arequirement
that the Crown attempt in good faith to negotiate an agreement that
identifies the respective rights of the parties to the territory in question .
Subsequent sections address what the duty entails in terms of funding
obligations; remedial options,, and negotiatingbehaviour of the parties.
A. Calibrating Consultation Requirements
TheSupremeCourt ofCanada was explicit inDelgamuukw thatthe content
ofthe duty to consult varies from context to context. In "rare" circumstances,
it will require the Crownonly to engage in «meaningful consultation»; in most
cases, the duty's content "will be significantly deeper than consultation ." 47 In
47 Supra at 1113 .
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some cases, the duty will require the Crown to obtain the consent ofthe First
Nation in question . InR. v. Marshall, the Court added that "[t]his variation
may reflect such factors as the seriousness and duration of the proposed
restriction, and whether or not the Minister is required to act in response to
unforeseen or urgent circumstances."48 In other words, the content of the
duty is to be calibrated according to the circumstances at hand, the severity
of the proposed Crown action, and the nature and extent of the Aboriginal
interests at stake . Several cases involving consultation processes mandated
by prior agreement between the parties illustrate that such calibration is
both possible and desirable .
In CreeSchoolBoardv. Canada (Attorney General), for example, the Cree
challenged the creation of an agreement between Quebec and Canada that
allowedforbudgetary approval offunding forthe Cree School Board. TheCree
claimedthatthis agreementviolated s.16oftheJamesBayandNorthern Quebec
Agreement, specifically s.16.0.23, which provides that
[t]he funding by Quebec and Canada .. . shall be provided to the Cree School Board
in accordance with a formula to be determined by the Quebec Department of
Education, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the
Crees .
Quebec and Canada argued that "the Cree School Board does not have to
be present when funding formulas are determined, and that it need only be
consulted, as is the case for other school boards ."49 In support of this
position, the government asserted that if anything more than consultation
was provided for, "the Crees could abuse the situation and block any
process." 5o
In rejecting the government's position, the Court described the JamesBay
Agreement as a "treaty" within the meaning of s.35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, and stated that it did "not agree with [the argument] . . . that the fiduciary
obligationofboth governments was transformedinto acontractualobligation ."51
The Court characterized the Cree School Board as amethod of exercising an
Aboriginal right, enabling the Cree to "control their own future in their own
language and culture, thereby preserving their distinctiveness."52 Since the
Agreement is a treaty, the Court concluded that the paragraphs in question
"provide for an exceptional regime which is outside the law governing the
management of the Canadian and Quebec governments."53 The case was
decided, however, mainly on the basis of the wording of the Agreement. The
word "determine" in s.16.0.23 was held to mean that "the obligation is for the
18 R. v . Mai-shall, supra at 43 .
49 [1998] 3 C.N.L.R . 24 (Que. Sup. Ct .), at 44 .
50 Ibid. at 57 .
51 Ibid. at 56 .
52 Ibid. at 49 .
53 Ibid. at 57 .
2000]
	
AboriginalRights and The Crown's Duty to Consult 269
three parties to determine the .budgetary rules together, not for Quebec and
Canada to determine them alone and impose their own modalities by
administrative agreement."54
Even where a prior agreement is not regarded as a treaty within the
meaning of s.35(1) of the Constitution Act,- 1982, its existence may
authorize heightened consultation requirements on the Crown. In Nunavut
Tunngaviklnc . v. Canada (Minister ofFisheries andOceans), for example;
the applicants challenged the determination of fishing quotas for 1997
based on the provisions of an agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut
Settlement Area and Canada. Specifically, the Inuit used Article 5 of the
agreement, which set out principles ofthe relationship between Canada and
the Nunavut Inuit, and Article 15, which set out substantive expectations of
the relationship between the government and the Nunavut Wildlife
Management Board, including the following:
15 .3 .4 Government shallseekthe advice oftheNWMB . . . TheNWMB shallprovide
relevant information to the government .
15 .3 .7 Government recognizes the importance of the principles of adjacency and
economic dependence of communities in the Nùnavut Settlement Area [NSA] on
marine resources and shall give special consideration to these factors . . .
. . . Government shall consider such advice [from various Nunavut agencies] and
recommendations in making decisions which affect marine areas .
The Government's 1997 allocation offish, which increased the total allowable
catch in a region that included the settlement area, was held to infringe the
Board's authority under s. 5.6.16, which grants sole authority to establish levels
of total allowable harvest in the settlement area . Campbell J. noted that :
there was no meaningful prior consultation with the [Board] on the apparently
stronglyheldviewoftheMinisterthat the Canadian share ofthe [total allowable catch]
should increase, and as a result, the [Board] really had no opportunity, to express a
precise position on this view s5
Most importantly, the Court interpreted the agreement to "require the sharing
of decision-making," and found that the evidence showed that Fisheries and
Oceans was "prepared to go only so . far in meeting their obligations to the
[Board] under the -Agreement."56 Rejecting the government's argument that
"consider" means"simply receive andexamine," the Courtheld that in light of
the provisions of the agreement, "there must be activities and results which
reflect the intent of the Agreement," including :
meaningful inclusion . . . in the. . . decision making process before any decisions
are made ; . . . full, careful and conscientious consideration of any advice or
recommendation made . . . [and] allowance must be made for the advice or
recommendations . . . [I]f a given position is not accepted+at the very least, out of
respect, an explanationfordoing so shouldbeprovided; . . . [and] priority consideration
54 Ibid, at 56 (emphasis deleted) .
55 (1997) 134 F.T.R. 246 (F.Ç.T.D.), at 257.




to . . . the position of. . . the Nunavut Inuit . . . [C]onsultation and consideration must
mean more than simply hearing . It must include listening as well57
Moreover, two recent decisions regard the existence of a prior agreement as
giving rise to a duty to negotiate in good faith an agreement that identifies the
rights and obligations of the respective parties . The first, Nunavik Inuit v .
Canada (Minister ofCanadian Heritage), involved a challenge by the Nunavik
Inuit to the planning of Torngat National Park in Labrador. The territory in
question was governed by a framework agreement under the federal
comprehensive land claims process, and theframework agreement required the
parties to negotiate in good faith an agreement in principle . The decision to
create the parkwas announcedwhile Canada was in the midstofnegotiating the
agreement inprinciple with Nunavik Inuit. Richard A.C.J . held that the Crown
is under a duty to negotiate in good faith when it agrees to negotiate an
agreement specifying the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect
to a particular territory . In noting that different land uses may affect the content
of the duty, the court stated :
Where a national park reserve is established, there is a minimal impact on the rights
and the use of land . There is . . . a duty to consult in such circumstances. Any
consultation must be meaningful . Where a national park itself is established, the
impact willoccur onthe title, the rights andthe use of land. There is, therefore, a duty
to consult and negotiate in good faith in such circumstances .5s
Richard A.C.J . concluded that the federal government owed a duty to consult
with Nunavik Inuit, including a duty to inform and listen, prior to establishing
aparkreservein the area,andaduty tonegotiate in goodfaithwith NunavikInuit
over its claim of Aboriginal title to certain parts of the territory prior to the
establishment of a national park in the area .
Similarly, in Gitanyow v. British Columbia, the Gitanyow First Nation
applied for a declaration that the Crown is obliged to negotiate in good faith an
agreement defining its Aboriginal rights . At the time of its application, the First
Nation had entered into a framework agreement and was in the process of
negotiating an agreement in principle with Canada and British Columbia, in
accordance with the terms of the British Columbia Treaty Commission
Agreement . Unlike Nunavik Inuit, the Gitanyow framework agreement didnot
expressly require the parties to negotiate in good faith . Williamson J . held that
although they were not obligated to conclude an agreement, both levels of
government were obliged to negotiate in good faith and make every reasonable
effort to conclude an agreement with the Gitanyow .59
57 Ibid. at 260 (emphasis deleted) .
58 [1998] F.C.J. No. 1114 (F.C.T.D.) at paras. 121-22 .
59 Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, 1999 B.C.D. Civ . J. 610 (March 23, 1999)
(B.C.S.C .) ; see also Chemainus First Nation v. British Columbia Assets and Lands
Corporation (7January,1999), Victoria983940 (B.C.S.C .) (ifanexus hasbeen established
between the First Nation and the land in question, a duty to negotiate in good faith flows
from the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the First Nation) .
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All of the above cases appear to regard the Crown's heightened
consultation requirements as flowingfrom the intersection of the Crown's
fiduciaryduty and the existence of a prior agreement between the parties .
In both Nunavik Inuit and Gitanyow, for example, the requirement that the
Crownact in good faith wasviewed as an incident ofthe Crown's fiduciary
duty, whereas the requirement that the Crown negotiate an agreement
identifying the rights of the respective parties was treated as a function of
the fact that the Crown was already participating in negotiations under the
rubric of a frameworkagreement. But it is not at all clearwhythe presence
ofaprioragreement, as opposedto the Crown'sduty to consult, should give
rise to heightened consultation requirements . Theabove decisions, on their
face, suggest- that the written text of the agreement supports heightened
consultation requirements . But, with the possible exception of Nunavik
Inuit, these requirements do not flow inexorably from the text at issue.
Perhaps comfort is found in the fact of an ongoing, already formalized
relationship . But Aboriginal peoples and the Crown already are in an
ongoing, formalized relationship - one that is fiduciary in nature . Ifthe duty
to consult is to operate inamanner thatfosters the creation of a constructive,
ongoing relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, then
consultation requirements ought to calibrated not only to the existence or
non-existence ofa prior agreement, but also to the nature of the Aboriginal
interests at stake and the severity of the proposed Crown action in question.
As noted, Delgamuukw offers a sliding scale that provides guidance on
how and when such calibration is to occur. At one end of the scale are the
"rare cases" where the Crown'sproposed action likely will have a minimal
impact on Aboriginal interests in the area . In such cases, the duty requires
good faith consultation and an effort to-substantially address the concerns
of the First Nation in question .60 At the other endof the scale are proposed
Crown actions that likely will cduse extensive interference with existing
Aboriginal or treaty rights . In suchcases, the duty effectively vests a veto
in the First Nation, as it requires the Crownto obtain the FirstNation's "full
consent" to the proposed action.61 Most cases fall in between these two
extremes, requiring ofthe Crown more than good faith consultation but not
requiring the parties to reach agreement: What lower courts have failed to
grasp is that the duty to consult in these cases requires the Crown to
negotiate in good faith and make every reasonable effort to reach an
agreement that delineates the rights of the parties to the territory in
question .
In Perry v. Ontario, for example, the Ardoch Algonquin First Nation
challenged Ontario's decision to repeal an interim enforcement policy calling
for the non-enforcement ofcertain game and fish laws against status Indians in
certain circumstances. The First Nation argued that s. 35(1) imposed an
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affirmative obligation upon Ontario to negotiate with First Nations to
"determine and identify the extent of their aboriginal rights .,,62 Rendering
judgment prior to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Delgamilukw,
the Ontario Court of Appeal declared the issue moot but when on to state
that "whilepracticality maydictate that the parties negotiate, the Constitution
does not."63
To the extent that it stands for the proposition that the Constitution
never mandates negotiations between a First Nation and the Crown, Perry
no longer is valid law. As a result ofDelgamuukw, the Constitution requires
the Crown not only to negotiate but to reach an agreement with a First
Nation in those cases where the duty requires "the full consent of an
Aboriginal nation."64 In most cases, the Constitution does not require the
parties to actually reach an agreement, but in such cases, the Crown is at
least under a duty to negotiate in good faith. Regardless of its precedential
value, Perry is an indication that the judiciary is reluctant to enforce
heightened consultation requirements in cases where the parties do not
have an ongoing relationship formalized by agreement. But heightened
consultation requirements in the presence of a prior agreement serve the
same purpose as heightened consultation requirements in the absence of a
prior agreement; they create incentives on the parties to determine their
respective rights without resorting to litigation . Holding the Crown to a
duty to negotiate in good faith in both cases increases the likelihood that the
parties themselves, and not the judiciary, will determine their respective
rights and obligations with respect to the territory in question . No doubt
judicial caution on this issue is fuelled by adesire not to handcufftheCrown
in the exercise of its legislative and executive authority, but a duty to
negotiate does notmean a duty to agree. It means instead a commitment to
reconciliation over litigation .
B. FundingRequirements
In order to fully participate in consultation processes as well as comply
with information requests, such as traditional use studies, First Nations
often seek funding from the Crown. Lower courts have been generally
unsympathetic to arguments about lack ofresources, occasionally suggesting
that the First Nations were overstating the amount of funds and expertise
62 Reterry et al. andthe Queen in Right ofOntario (1997),148 D.L.R . (4th) 96 (Ont.
C.A .), at 116.
63 Ibid. at 166-7. See alsoDelganneukw v. The Queen, supra, perMcEachernC.J. ("the
Supreme Court has nojurisdiction to declare that the defendants are obliged to negotiate . . .
[s]till less has theSupreme Courtthe powerto directthe defendants to meetwiththe plaintiffs
and negotiate in good faith") ; Delgamuukw v. the Queen (1993), 104 D.L.R . (41) 470
(B.C.C.A .), per Macfarlane J.A . ("negotiations arenot the province of the court').
64 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra at 1113 .
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needed to carry out the necessary investigations . In Kelly Lake Cree First
Nation, for example, the Saulteaux First Nation argued that they were
"without the resources to provide information," but the judge responded
that while it was established "that this community . . . is of limited means,
[it] does not establish acommunity incapable of providing the information
sought ."65 The judge referred to a document prepared by the First Nation,
prepared with the assistance of the Treaty 8 Tribal Association, and stated
that it "illustrates the ability of the . . . [First Nation] to respond to the kind
ofrequest for information made ofit . . . . and more importantly to participate
in the process ofconsultation ."66 Andin Tsilhgot' inNational Government,
denial of funding was oneof the grounds for the Tsilhqot'in's claim that no
consultation has taken place, but the Board did not address the issue. except
to comment that lack of funding "does not explain why the Appellant did
not attempt to supply at least some specific information, to the best of its
ability, on its traditional customs andpractices relating to the resources and
locations in the areas in question."67 ' _
First Nations, often located far from urban centres, typically possess
limited financial and technical resources, and must address a number of
pressing questions relating to the concerns of their membership on a daily
basis. Funding to assist participation and the provision of information is
critical to the success of the consultation process. If inadequate funding
prevents aFirst Nation from providing the Crownwithrelevantinformation,
then the ultimate decision whether and how to engage in the activity in
question will not have been based on a proper understanding of the
Aboriginal interests at stake. More importantly, inadequate funding
decreases the likelihood that the Crown would be convinced ofthe validity
of the Aboriginal interests in the territory in question, and increases the
likelihood of the Crownproceeding with an action that subsequently forms
the basis of litigation .
Properly understood, the duty to consult requires the Crown to provide
sufficient funds to a First Nation that may be adversely affected by a
proposed Crownaction to enable it to participate in consultation processes
and gather relevant information in a timely manner. In Halfway River, the
court intimated that the duty to consult might impose funding obligations
on the Crown, stating that it was "arguable . . . that . . . a court [could] order
the Crown to comply with a duty even where compliance necessitates the
expenditure of funds."68 Compliance with the duty, however, invariably
necessitates the expenditure of funds;, the duty to consult, even in its
minimal form, is not cost-free . If the duty is to enhance the likelihood of
negotiated settlements, one of the costs it ought to impose on the Crownis
65 Supra at para . 244.
66 Ibid. at para . 245.
67 Supra at para . 68 .




the provision of provide adequate funding to a First Nation to ensure
effective participation and the sharing of information in consultation
processes.
C. Remedial Options
When the Crown breaches its duty to consult in the context of an
allegation that a particular Crown action may constitute a violation of an
existing Aboriginal or treaty right recognized and affirmed by s. 35(l) of
the Constitution Act, 1982, the ultimate remedy available to the aggrieved
party is a declaration that the action in question is unconstitutional . Lower
courts typically have not required the Crown to fulfil its duty to consult
prior to engaging in the action in question .69 However, in a number of cases
that also involve compliance with statutory requirements, such as
environmental assessment requirements, courts occasionally have ordered
the Crown to take affirmative steps in this regard . In Cheslatta Carrier
Nation, the judge ordered that anew consultative committee be set up and
empowered, unless all parties were satisfied with the existing committee .
The private company involved was also ordered to produce "missing"
in: formation.70 However, in Treaty 8 Tribal Association, the Panel refused
to order consultation, stating thatthis wouldnot "set the type of collaborative
climate required to ensure willing participation by the parties," but it did
cancel the pesticide permits at issue. This Panel also refused to make any
orders about the consultation process, saying that "in order for the parties
to havean effective working arrangement, they themselves must be involved
in the design of the consultative process.-71
If the Crown's duty to consult is to relate to the judicial call for
negotiation overlitigation, then remedies ought to be fashioned in a manner
that, in the Panel's words in Treaty 8 Tribal Association, "set the type of
collaborative climate required to ensure willing participation by the
parties."72 In certain cases, the appropriate remedy would be to order
negotiations ; in other cases, such aremedy might be wholly inappropriate.
Generating a collaborative climate may require greater sharing of
information; in other cases, it may require prohibiting the Crown from
exercising its discretion in a particular way or to achieve a particular
69 SeeHalftvay River, supra at 78 ("since the duty to consult is notimposed by any
statute, but rather as a consequence of the requirement of procedural fairness and the
fiduciary duty of the Crown, the court may not compel [consultation] . . . This . . . would
appear to be sound") .
70 Cheslatta Carrier Nation, supra at 23 . Thejudge declined to grant an injunction,
citing the late stage of development of the project.
71 Treaty 8 Tribal Association v . British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1994]
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outcome. Butthe overall purpose of aremedy in the context of abreach of
a duty to consult ought to be to facilitate outcomes determined by theparties
themselves, without the need for subsequent litigation .
Although the duty to consult requires remedial flexibility on the question
of whether and to what extent the Crown ought to be ordered to engage in
consultations, it requires bright-line rules regarding- the availability of
interlocutory injunctions. Generally speaking, in orderto obtain aninterlocutory
injunction, an applicant must show that (a) its underlying claim presents a fair
question to be tried as to the existence of the right alleged andabreach thereof;
(b) without an injunction, irreparable harm will occur; and (c) the balance of
convenience favours the application73 Despite anumber of early high profile
successes'in obtaining interlocutory injunctions,74 lower courts have become
increasingly reluctant to order this form of interim relief in cases involving an
assertionofAboriginalor treaty rights or anallegedfailure oftheCrowntofulfil
its duty to consult75
Whether interlocutory injunctions ought to be more readily available in
cases involving the assertion ofan Aboriginal or treaty right is beyondthe scope
of this Article. Withrespect to cases involving a breach of the Crown's duty to
consult, however, judicial reluctance to grant interlocutory injunctions creates
aperverse incentive on the Crown to engage in ineffective consultations with
aFirst Nation . If it is to serve its objective of fostering negotiated settlements,
the duty to consult requires a default rule that provides that theCrowncannot
proceed with a proposed action that threatens Aboriginal interests unless and
until it has fulfilled its duty to consult.
Inmostcases, this defaultrulerequires theCrownto make good faithefforts
to reach an agreement with the First Nation as to the respective rights of the
partiesto'the disputed territory. IftheCrownhasmade good faith efforts in this
73 RJR MacDonaldInc . v. Canada, [199411 S.C.R . 311 .
74 MacMillan Bloedel Limited v . Mullin (1985), 61 B .C.L.R . 145 (C.A.) («Meares
Island») ; Pasco v . Canadian National Railway Company (1985), 69 B.C.L.R. 76 (S.C .),
aff'd [198611 C.N.L.R. 34 (B.C.C.A.) ; Huntv . HalcanLog Services (1986),15 B.C.L.R.
(2d) 165 (S.C .) . .
75 McLeod Lake Indian Band Chief v . B.C. (1988), 33 B.C:L.R . (2d) 378 (S.C .) ;
Westar Timber Ltd. v . Ryan et al . ; Formula Contractors Ltd . v. Herb George et al .
(unreported B :C .S .C. decision dated October 21, 1988); Wiigyet (Morrison) et al. v .
District Manager, Kispibx Forest District et al (1991) 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 73 (B .C .); The
Towitsis Nation etal. v . MacMillanBloedel Ltd., [1991] 2C.N.L.R. 164 (B.C.S.C.) ; Ryan
v . Fort St . James Forest District, January 25, 1994, Smithers Reg. No . 7855 (B.C .S.C .);
Wilps Gutginuxs v . KispioxForest (District) ActingManager (1995),127 D.L.R .(4th) 568
(B .C.S.C .) ; Council of the Cheslatta Carrier Nation and Chief Marvin Charlie v .
Marczyk et al ., July 12,1996, File No . A954336, Vancouver Registry (B.C .S.C.) ; The
Tsay:KehDeneBandv . British Columbia, June 10, 1997, CourtFilé97/0723, Victoria
Registry (B.C.S.C .) ; but see Jules v. Harper Ranch Ltd. [1989] 3 C.N.L.R . 67
(B .C.S.C .) . See generally John J.L . Hunter, Q.C., The Use ofInjunctions to Protect
Claims ofAboriginalRights, in Pacific Business &Law Institute, LitigatingAboriginal
Claims (April 15, 1998).
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regard but circumstances are such that it is unlikely that an agreement can
be reached with the First Nation, then the general principles respecting
interlocutory relief ought to govern whether an interlocutory injunction
ought to be granted pending judicial determination of the First Nation's
underlying case . However, where the Crown proceeds with its proposed
action without adequate consultation with an affected First Nation, and
where circumstances support an order that the Crown engage in mandatory
negotiations, the Crown ought to be enjoined from proceeding with the
action in question until such a time that it would be reasonable to expect the
parties to determine whether a negotiated settlement is feasible . If
circumstances do not support mandatory negotiations, then an interlocutory
injunction ought to be granted pending judicial determination of the First
Nation's underlying case .
D . Consultation as a Two-Way Street
In R. v . Nikal, a case involving the constitutionality of a fish licensing
scheme, Cory J ., for a majority ofthe Supreme Court of Canada, stated that "in
the aspects ofinformation and consultation the concept ofreasonableness must
come into play."76 Lowercourts have invoked Nikalinsupportofthe proposition
that, despite the fact that the duty to consult attaches to the Crown, the way in
which a First Nation conducts itself in the consultative process may affect its
ability to retain its right to be consulted . As stated by Finch J.A . in Halfway
River, "[there is a reciprocal duty on aboriginal peoples to express their
interests and concerns once they have had an opportunity to consider the
information provided by the Crown, and to consult in good faith by whatever
means are available to them .-77 Consultation, in other words, is understood to
be a "two way street."7s
InRyan v . British Columbia,forexample, MacdonaldJ . rejected allegations
that a cutting permit was issued without consultation with an affected First
Nation, stating the First Nation was:
. . .not content to consult with MOF. . . Instead, while refusing to engage in any
discourse as to the nature ofthe rights they claim in this area, they insist that nothing
shouldoccur withouttheir consent . Furthermore, any such consent is contingentupon
the Province agreeing toaCo-ManagementAgreement on theirterms . They delivered
anultimatum to MOF with respect to the area in question . . . . They are only interested
in a process which will give them such control and, as I read the [material] . . . they are
using theiropposition to this Cutting Block . . . as a lever in the bargaining process . . . .
76 R. v. Nikal, [199611 S.C.R. 1013, at 1065 .
77 SeeHalfway RiverFirst Nation v.British Columbia (MinisterofForests), [1999]
B.C.J. No . 1880, at para. 161, per Finch J.A.
7$ Cheslatta CarrierNation at 21, citing Ryan et al v. Fort St. James ForestDistrict
(DistrictManager) [1994] B.C.J. No 2642 (Smithers No . 7855 and 7856 (B .C .S.C .) affd
(1994) 40 B.C.A.C . 91 (C.A.) .
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Consultation did not work here because the Gitksan did not want it to work . The
process was impeded by their persistent refusal to take part intheprocess unless their
fundamental demands were met .. . It was the failure of the Petitioners to avail
themselves of the consultation process, except on their own terms, which lies at the
heart of this dispute. 79
Similarly, inKellyLake Cree FirstNation, after describing the process as "less
of a process of discussion in which [the Salteaux First Nation] sought to
participate and much more of a process in which [they] sought to delay the
decision,"TaylorJ. statedthat"[a]nyresponsibility for theabsence ofconsultation
lies with their own representatives." 80 He added that :
In order to stall the making of any decision other than rejection of the application, the
SFNcontinued to demand further consultation and complained of a lack of it on the
part oftheGovernment . . . [theGovernment]sawthe SFNas wishing tohavethepower
of a vetoas opposed to wishing to participate in consultations as done with the other
two First Nations.s 1 .
Cases involving statutory consultation requirements or prior agreements
that have imposed heightened., consultation requirements are divided on
whether reasonableness extends to .behaviour which looks like hard
bargaining . In Cree School Board, the Quebec Superior Court held that the
fact that «people [are] sincere andfirmly believe in their owntruth» is not
relevant to determining whether heightened consultation requirements are
appropriate, although it may signal the culmination of unsuccessful
negotiations .82 InLabradorMetis Ass' n. v . Canada (Minister ofFisheries
andOceans), however, the Court held that it was appropriate for the Crown
to cease consultations with the Association when it formed the impression
that the Associationwas attempting to "lever an initial attempt at obtaining
a communal fishing license into recognition by the Crown of the
Association's Aboriginal rights . -93
Holding a First Nation to a standard of reasonableness is consistent
with :the duty's objective of fostering negotiated settlements. If à First
Nation acts unreasonably in a consultation process designed to determine
the respective rights of the parties, and the Crown has made good faith
efforts to, negotiate an agreement, the Crown ought to be free to proceed
with the proposed action, subject to the general . principles governing
interlocutory relief pending judicial determination of the First Nation's
underlying case . However, the standard of reasonableness required of the
First Nation ought to vary with the degree of consultation requirements
imposedon theCrown. In most cases, the nature of the Aboriginal interests
andthe severity of the proposed Crownaction are such thattheCrownowes
79 Ibid . at paras 21-26.
so Supra at paras. 127, 252.
81 Ibid . at 113.
92 Supra at 57 .




a duty to negotiate with a First Nation . In such cases, the First Nation must
be allowed more latitude than what would be required in cases where the
proposed Crown action likely will have a minimal impact on Aboriginal
interests in the area. Negotiations, at least in some circumstances, require
parties to engage in hard bargaining in an effort to extract concessions from
the other. To the extent the law regards hard bargaining as constituting
behaviour that will affect aFirst Nation's rightto be consulted, it discourages
real negotiations between the parties, because the First Nation will rightly
fear that such conduct will result in the loss of its right to be consulted.
Even in those rare circumstances where consultation requirements fall
short of a duty to negotiate, a First Nation must be entitled to seek to ensure
that consultations are as extensive and meaningful as possible . In Halfway
River, for example, the Crown claimed that the First Nation had acted
unreasonably, since it had insisted that consultation : be meaningful ; be
based on a process acceptable to both sides; include the provision of
funding; and proceed only with assurances that no activity would take place
in the disputed area pending its claim and an assessment of the impact on
its rights . Dorgan J. at trial noted that the First Nation did not refuse to meet
with the Crown but in fact requested such meetings ; did not demand a
consultation process on its own terms, but one acceptable to both parties;
and was facing a situation in which the Crown had failed to make all
reasonable efforts to consult.84 Adversarial behaviour, in other words,
should not absolve the Crown of its duty to consult.
Holding a First Nation to a standard ofreasonableness, however, is not
consistent with the other objective of the Crown's duty to consult, namely,
to assist in determining whether and to what extent the Crown is
constitutionally justified in engaging in a particular action that infringes an
existing Aboriginal or treaty right recognized by s. 35(1). Whether a First
Nation acts reasonably or unreasonably when consulted by the Crown
should be irrelevant to a determination of the ultimate constitutionality of
the Crown action in question . To hold otherwise would render the
constitutional recognition and affirmation ofexisting Aboriginal and treaty
rights contingent on the behaviour of the First Nation in contexts unrelated
to the exercise of its rights .
Conclusion
Eugene Lome Gordon, a Kitkatla fisherman, in an affidavit introduced in
oneofthe Kitkatla proceedings, described how, when he was a boy, he used
to travel throughout the Kumealon Lake region with his paternal
84 Supra at 75-6 .
85 Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister ofForests), [1998] B.C .J . No. 2667
(B.C.S.C.) (June 18, 1998), at para . 8.
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grandmother.85 He remembered Kitkatla people building dugout canoes
from red cedar trees and weaving baskets from red cedar bark, and
recounted how he and his family continue to hunt for game in the region .
At the end of the day, the judiciary, after a lengthy trial and numerous
appeals, likely will determine whether evidence such as that provided by
Mr. Gordon is sufficient to establish that the Kitkatla First Nation holds
Aboriginal title to the area . Litigation over actions like the logging of the
Kumealon Lake region, however, is expensive, time-consuming, and
ultimately incapable ofresolving competing claims to territory in a manner
that addresses the interests of all parties. In contrast, negotiated outcomes
enable the parties to participate directly and constructively in fashioning a
complex set of mutually agreeable trade-offs .
Giëén the, stakes involved, litigation will never disappear from view in
cases involving the assertion of Aboriginal title . Butthe lawought to create
incentives on the parties to first attempt to reach negotiated outcomes that
define their respective rights . In most cases, the duty to consult requires the
Crown to make good faith efforts to negotiate an agreement that translates
Aboriginal interests adversely affected by a proposed Crown action into
binding Aboriginalor treatyrights . By promoting negotiation over litigation,
the duty willfoster one ofthe key objectives ofthe constitutional recognition
and affirmation ofAboriginal and treaty rights, namely, "the reconciliation
of the pre-existencè of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the
Crown."86
86 R. v . Van der Peet, supra at 539 .
